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Abstract
An important step in the development of value alignment (VA) systems in AI
is understanding how values can interrelate with facts. Designers of future VA
systems will need to utilize a hybrid approach in which ethical reasoning and
empirical observation interrelate successfully in machine behavior. In this article
we identify two problems about this interrelation that have been overlooked
by AI discussants and designers. The first problem is that many AI designers
commit inadvertently a version of what has been called by moral philosophers
the “naturalistic fallacy,” that is, they attempt to derive an “ought” from an “is.”
We illustrate when and why this occurs. The second problem is that AI designers
adopt training routines that fail fully to simulate human ethical reasoning in the
integration of ethical principles and facts. Using concepts of quantified modal
logic, we proceed to offer an approach that promises to simulate ethical reasoning
in humans by connecting ethical principles on the one hand and propositions
about states of affairs on the other.
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1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is an attempt to imitate human intelligence. Indeed,
Alan Turing’s idea of the Turing Test was originated from “the Imitation
Game”—a game in which a man imitates a woman’s behavior to deceive the
interrogator sitting in a different room [1]. Research shows that AI has imitated
much of human intelligence, especially, calculative and strategic intelligence
(e.g., AlphaGo’s victory over human champions). As highly developed AI
technologies are rapidly adopted for automating decisions, societal worries about
the compatibility of AI and human values are growing. As a response, researchers
have examined how to imitate moral intelligence as well as calculative and
strategic intelligence. Such attempts are lumped under the broader term, “value
alignment” (hereafter VA). Given that a unique element of human intelligence
is moral intelligence—a capability to make an ethical decision–the attempt to
imitate moral promises to bring AI to another, higher level.
Russell et al. [2] highlighted the need for VA and identified options for
achieving it:
“[A]ligning the values of powerful AI systems with our own values
and preferences ... [could involve either] a system [that] infers the
preferences of another rational or nearly rational actor by observing
its behavior ... [or] could be explicitly inspired by the way humans
acquire ethical values.”
This passage reflects two types of goals that are frequently attributed to VA.
One is to teach machines human preferences, and another is to teach machines
ethics. The word “values” in fact has this double meaning. It can refer to what
humans value in the sense of what they see as desirable, or it can refer to ethical
principles. The distinction is important, because we acquire knowledge of the
two types of values in different ways.
Values in the first sense are phenomena that can be studied empirically by
observing human activity. That is to say, values in this sense can be studied using
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observation or experience to determine facts about human behavior, in particular,
about what humans actually value. Values in the second sense cannot be inferred
solely from observation or experience, and an attempt to do so commits the
naturalistic fallacy. This is the fallacy of inferring what is right solely from a
description of a state of affairs, or in short, inferring an “ought” from an “is.”
For example, the fact that people engage in a certain activity or believe that it is
ethical, does not in itself imply that the activity is ethical. Thus if VA is based
solely on inverse reinforcement learning or other empirical methods, it cannot
yield genuine ethical principles. Observation must somehow be combined with
ethical principles that are obtained non-empirically. We illustrate some failures
to do so that either commit the naturalistic fallacy (of deriving an “ought” from
an “is”) or oversimplify the process of moral reasoning. Finally, we move to
suggest a hybrid process that interrelates values and facts using concepts of
quantified modal logic.
Our proposal differs from the hybrid approach of Allen et al. [3], who
recommend combining top-down and bottom-up approaches to machine ethics.
The top-down approach installs ethical principles directly into the machine, while
the bottom-up approach asks the machine to learn ethics from experience. The
distinction may seem related to ours but is quite different. Both approaches
combine the ideas of top-down and bottom-up, but Allen et al. focus on pedagogy
whereas we focus on epistemology. We confront, as Allen et al. do not, the issue
of the proper justification of ethical behavior. Allen et al. are concerned with
the process of teaching machines to internalize ethics, whereas our approach
raises the question of what counts as ethical reasoning. From an epistemological
perspective, Allen et al.’s bottom-up approach can result in teaching strategies
that either conflate “is”s and “ought”s or that effect their separation ad hoc.
They suggest, for example, that a machine might learn ethics through a simulated
process of evolution. This commits the naturalistic fallacy, because the fact that
certain ethical norms evolve does not imply that they are valid ethical principles.
Elsewhere they suggest that a bottom-up teaching style might also “seek to
provide environments in which appropriate behavior is selected or rewarded.”
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Adopting this style, trainers could reward behavior that is viewed a priori to be
right, which is a reward strategy that parents successfully use with children. Yet
while such a hybrid approach has practical advantages as a teaching strategy, it
does not add up to genuine ethical reasoning.
Another version of a hybrid approach to VA is advocated by Arnold et al. [4],
who suggest that ethical rules can be imposed as constraints on what a machine
learns from observation. Their motivation is to ensure that the machine is not
influenced by bad behavior. Yet the epistemic question cannot be avoided. We
must ask what remains within the unconstrained space of observational learning.
If it is learning that includes ethical norms, then once again we confront the
naturalistic fallacy. If it is learning that includes empirical facts about the world,
then those facts cannot be transformed into “oughts.”
Our thesis is that ethical principles must relate to empirical observation in
a different way. Ethical principles are not constraints on what is learned from
observation. Facts that are derived from observation do matter when evaluating
ethical behavior but not as justifications per se. To take a simple example of how
facts can matter, notice that someone’s opinion about values may be relevant to
one’s moral evaluation of their actions. Suppose, for example, that a person has
been raised to believe that women should be barred from certain jobs. Their
belief may be a factor in evaluating their behavior as an adult. However, facts
can be seen to be intertwined with human ethical decision-making in a much
more direct manner. Every piece of ethical reasoning that motivates behavior,
as we shall illustrate, involves some fact. This insight is especially important
when confronting the task of simulating human ethical reasoning in machines.
We offer a hybrid approach to VA that integrates independently justified
ethical principles and empirical knowledge in the AI decision-making process.
The aim is to simulate genuine human ethical reasoning without committing the
naturalistic fallacy. We formulate principles that are understood through the
“deontological” tradition of ethics, that is, the tradition that derives principles
from the logical structure of action. We foreshadow the hybridization of facts
and principles by showing how the application of deontological principles requires
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an assessment of what one can rationally believe about the world. Applying the
imperative, “Thou shalt not kill,” to a given action requires at a minimum that
someone knows that the facts relevant to the action are facts about killing. The
language of ethics, notably, is frequently the language of imperatives such as
“Don’t lie” and “Don’t kill,” which is to say that it is a language of sentences
that guide action rather than describing action. Contrast, for example, the
action-guiding imperative, “Shut the door,” to the descriptive proposition, “The
door is shut.” Ethical imperatives almost always take the form of “If the
facts are such-and-such, then do A.” Usually, moreover, they combine more
than one “If-then” imperative. For example, “If the facts are such-and-such,
then do A; however, if the facts are so-and-so, then do B.” This exemplifies
how empirical knowledge is inseparable from ethical decision making, even
though ethical principles themselves cannot be grounded empirically. In turn,
this provides a clue about how VA might knit together ethical principles and
empirical observation, even as the former guides action while the latter invokes
observations about human behavior, preferences and values.
Our paper is divided into three parts. The first part explains what is meant
by the “naturalistic fallacy” and the problems the fallacy poses for successful VA.
The second part illustrates examples of VA that either inadvertently commit the
naturalistic fallacy or that fail fully to simulate human ethical reasoning in the
integration of values and facts. The illustrations include Microsoft’s Twitter Bot,
Tay; the design of a robotic wheelchair; MIT Media Lab’s Moral Machine; and
an attempt to incorporate moral intuitions from a professional moralist. The
third and final part advances a method that promises to effectively integrate
ethical principles with empirical VA, using deontological moral analysis and the
language of quantified modal logic. Three deontological principles are isolated:
generalization, utility maximization, and respect for autonomy. In each instance,
the principle is first formulated then interrelated with empirical facts using the
language of quantified modal logic. The resulting method shows that the role
of ethics is to derive necessary conditions for the rightness of specific actions,
whereas the role of empirical VA is to ascertain whether these conditions are
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satisfied in the real world.
2. The Naturalistic Fallacy
The term “naturalistic fallacy” refers to the epistemic error of reducing
normative prescriptions to descriptive (or naturalistic) propositions without
remainder. Disagreements about the robustness of the fallacy abound, so
this paper adopts a modest, workable interpretation coined recently by Daniel
Singer, namely, “There are no valid arguments from non-normative premises
to a relevantly normative conclusion”[5]. Descriptive statements report states
of affairs, whereas normative statements are stipulative and action-guiding.
Examples of the former are “The car is red,” and “Many people find bluffing to
be okay.” Examples of the latter are “You ought not murder,” and “Lying is
wrong.”
As an example, consider the following argument:
Premise: Few people are honest.
Conclusion: Therefore, dishonesty is ethical.
This argument commits the naturalistic fallacy. The point is not that the
conclusion is wrong or ethically undesirable, but that it is invalid to draw
the normative conclusion directly from the descriptive premise. In any valid
argumentation, information that is not contained in premises must not be in
the conclusion. The premise above only describes a state of affairs. It does not
contain any normative/ethical statement (e.g., right, wrong, ethical, unethical,
good, bad, etc.). Thus, the conclusion should not contain any ethical component.
One might formally avoid the naturalistic fallacy by adopting some such
catch-all normative premise as, “Machines ought to reflect observed human
preferences and values.” However, the premise is unacceptable on its face.
Humans regularly exhibit bad behavior that ought not be imitated by machines.
For example, empirical research shows that most people’s behavior includes
a small but significant amount of cheating [6]. Worse, there have been social
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Figure 1: Microsoft’s Twitter-bot Tay
contexts in which slavery or racism have been generally practiced and condoned.
We can make sure machines are not exposed to behavior we consider unethical,
but in that case, their ethical norms are not based on observed human preferences
and values, but on the ethical principles espoused by their trainers. This, of
course, is one reasonable approach. But when taking this approach, we must
carefully formulate and justify those principles, rather than simply saying, with
a wave of the hand, that machines ought to reflect observed human values.
3. Examples of VA
It is instructive to examine how some VA systems attempt to deal with
ethical principles and empirical observation.
3.1. Microsoft’s Twitter-bot, Tay
Microsoft’s AI-based chatter-bot Tay (an acronym for “thinking about you”)
was designed to engage with people on Twitter and learn from them how to carry
on a conversation. When some people started tweeting racist and misogynistic
expressions, Tay responded in kind. Microsoft immediately terminated the
experiment [7]. Tay’s VA was purely imitative and vividly illustrates the practical
downside of committing the naturalistic fallacy.
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3.2. Robotic Wheelchair
Johnson and Kuipers [8] developed an AI-based wheelchair that learns norms
by observing how pedestrians behave. The robotic wheelchair observed that
human pedestrians stay to the right and copied this behavior. This positive
outcome was possible because the human pedestrians behaved ethically, unlike
Twitter users in the case of Tay. But if the intelligent wheelchair were trained
on a crowded New York City street, then its imitation of infamously jostling
pedestrians could result in a “demon wheelchair.” An ethical outcome was
ensured by selecting an appropriate training set. This is a case of bottom-up
learning that avoids the naturalistic fallacy by applying ethical principles to
the design of the training set. Hence the robotic wheel chair fails to show how
deontologically derived ethical principles can combine with empirical VA in a
systematic way; it fails to show how ethical reasoning and empirical observation
interrelate.
3.3. MIT Media Lab’s Moral Machine
“Moral Machine” is a website that poses trolley-car-type dilemmas involving
autonomous vehicles. The page has collected over 30 million responses to these
dilemmas from more than 180 countries. Kim et al. [9] analyzed these data to
develop “a computational model of how the human mind arrives at a decision
in a moral dilemma.” On the assumption that respondents are making moral
decisions in a utilitarian fashion, the authors used Bayesian methods to infer the
utility that respondents implicitly assign to characteristics of potential accident
victims. For example, they inferred the utility of saving a young person rather
than an old person, or a female rather than a male. Or more precisely, they
inferred the parameters of probability distributions over utilities. They then
aggregated the individual distributions to obtain a distribution for the population
of a given region. This distribution presumably reflects the cultural values of
that region and could form the basis for the design of autonomous vehicles.
There is no naturalistic fallacy in this scheme if the outcome is viewed simply
as a summary of cultural preferences, with no attempt to infer morals. Yet it
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seems likely that designers of a “moral machine” would be interested in whether
the machine is moral. Suppose, for example, that a given culture assigns less
value to members of a minority race or ethnic group. This kind of bias would
be built into autonomous vehicles. Designers might point out that they did not
include race and ethnic identity in their scenarios, and so this problem does not
arise. But omitting race and ethnicity then becomes an ethical choice, and the
resulting value system is neither culturally accurate nor ethically grounded. It is
bad anthropology because it omits widespread racial and ethnic bias, and it is
ethically unsound because it fails to evaluate other cultural preferences ethically.
One possible escape from this impasse is to view the Moral Machine as
prescribing actions that are ethical because they maximize utility. In fact, Kim
et al. preface their discussion of utility functions with a reference to Jeremy
Bentham’s utilitarian ethics, and one might see an inferred utility function as
maximizing social utility in Benthamite fashion. Kim et al. are careful not to
claim as much for their approach, but they state that Noothigattu et al. [10]
“introduced a novel method of aggregating individuals [sic] preferences such that
the decision reached after the aggregation ensures global utility maximization.”
Noothigattu et al. draw on computational social choice theory to aggregate
individual preferences in a way that satisfies certain formal properties, including
“stability” and “swap-dominance efficiency.” They do not explicitly claim to
maximize utility but state only that their system “can make credible decisions on
ethical dilemmas in the autonomous vehicle domain” (page 20, original emphasis).
Importantly, there is no direct identification of a “credible” decision with an
ethical one. Moreover, it is questionable whether any method that aggregates
individual preferences, preferences that, again, amount to facts, can escape the
naturalistic fallacy.
Classical utilitarianism as articulated by moral philosophers is based on
the principle that an ethical action must maximize total net expected utility.
Utility is an outcome that is regarded a priori as intrinsically valuable, such
as pleasure or happiness. A VA system can certainly represent preferences by
assigning “utilities” to the options in such a way that options with greater utility
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Figure 2: MIT Media Lab’s Moral Machine website
are preferred to those with less utility. However, this sense of utility is not the
same as the moral utilitarian’s, because it is only a measure of what individuals
prefer, rather than an intrinsically valuable quality. Individuals may base their
preferences on criteria other than their estimate of utility in the ethical sense.
They may base their preferences on mere personal desires and prejudices instead
of, say, the values of equality and justice. At best, one might view individual
utility functions as a rough indicators of utilitarian value for ethical purposes.
Later, we will show how a more sophisticated version of the utilitarian principle
can, in fact, play a legitimate role in VA, but without the error of confusing
preferences for values.
3.4. VA Based on Moral Intuitions
Anderson and Anderson [11] use inductive logic programming for VA. The
training data reflect domain-specific principles embedded in the intuitions of
professional ethicists. For their normative ground, Anderson and Anderson
follow moral philosopher W. D. Ross [12], who believed that “[M]oral con-
victions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just
as sense-perceptions are the data of a natural science.” Likewise, Anderson
and Anderson (2011) used “ethicists’ intuitions to . . . [indicate] the degree of
satisfaction/violation of the assumed duties within the range stipulated, and
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Figure 3: GENETH[11]
which actions would be preferable, in enough specific cases from which a machine-
learning procedure arrived at a general principle.” Anderson and Anderson’s
approach constitutes one of the better attempts to avoid the naturalistic fallacy,
but reveals a number of shortcomings.
One can interpret Anderson and Anderson’s maneuver as avoiding the
naturalistic fallacy in one of two ways. On one interpretation, it does not
attempt to infer ethical principles from the intuitions of experts, but simply
assumes that, as a matter of empirical fact, experts are likely to have intuitions
that conform to valid ethical principles—or at least more likely than the average
person. We cannot evaluate this empirical claim, however, until we identify
valid ethical principles independently of the opinions of experts, and Anderson
and Anderson do not indicate how this might be accomplished. Supposing
nonetheless that we can identify valid principles a priori, the claim that expert
opinion usually conforms to them is unsupported by evidence, insofar as experts
notoriously disagree. Experimental ethicists have shown that moral intuitions
are less consistent than we think (e.g., moral intuitions are susceptible to morally
irrelevant situational cues) [14], and the intuitions of professional ethicists fail
to diverge markedly from those of ordinary people [15].
In any case, if we are ultimately going to judge the results of VA by ethical
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principles we hold a priori, we may as well rely on ethical principles from the
start, absent an appeal to experts.
A second interpretation is that Anderson and Anderson are literally adopting
Ross’s theory, which steers clear of the naturalistic fallacy by viewing right and
wrong as “non-natural properties” of actions. There is no inference of ethical
norms from states of affairs in nature, because ethical properties are not natural
states of affairs in the first place. Ross asserts that one can discern ethical
properties through intuition, particularly if one reflects on them carefully, in a
way roughly analogous to how one perceives such logical truths as the law of
non-contradiction. While Ross’s is an interesting theory about ethical concepts
that deserves serious thought, the mysterious quality of its non-natural ethical
properties is a stumbling block that has helped to deter its wide acceptance. It
is also difficult to imagine how such a theory can be put into practice, especially
when thoughtful experts disagree over values, as they often do. The biggest
flaw of intuitionism for AI is its most obvious: intuitionism fails to show how
intuition-derived ethical principles can combine with empirical VA in a systematic
way, that is, how ethical reasoning and empirical observation interrelate.
4. Integrating Ethical Principles and Empirical VA
We now show how deontologically derived ethical principles can combine with
empirical VA in a systematic way. Our purpose is not to defend deontological
analysis in any detail, but to show how a careful statement of the resulting
principles clarifies how ethical reasoning and empirical observation interrelate.
We will argue that expressing ethical assertions in the idiom of quantified modal
logic, as developed in [16], makes this relationship particularly evident. Ethical
principles imply logical propositions that must be true for a given action to be
ethical, and whose truth is an empirical question that must often be answered
by observing human values, beliefs, and behavior. Thus the role of ethics is to
derive necessary conditions for the rightness of specific actions, and the role of
empirical VA is to ascertain whether these conditions are satisfied in the real
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world.
We will focus on three principles (generalization, utility maximization, and
respect for autonomy) and illustrate their application. Each of these principles
states a necessary condition for ethical conduct, although they may not be jointly
sufficient.
4.1. Generalization Principle
The generalization principle, like all the ethical principles we consider, rests
on the universality of reason: rationality does not depend on who one is, only
on one’s reasons. Thus if an agent takes a set of reasons as justifying an action,
then to be consistent, the agent must take these reasons as justifying the same
action for any agent to whom the reasons apply. The agent must therefore be
rational in believing that his/her reasons are consistent with the assumption
that all agents to whom the reasons apply take the same action.
As an example, suppose I see watches on open display in a shop and steal one.
My reasons for the theft are that I would like to have a new watch, and I can
get away with taking one. These reasons are not psychological motivations for
my behavior, but reasons that I consciously adduce as sufficient for my decision
to steal.1 At the same time, I cannot rationally believe that I would be able
to get away with the theft if everyone stole watches when these reasons apply.
The shop would install security measures to prevent theft, which is inconsistent
with one of my reasons for stealing the watch. The theft therefore violates the
generalization principle.
The decision to steal a watch can be expressed in terms of formal logic as
1In practice, reasons for theft are likely to be more complicated than this. I may be willing
to steal partly because I believe the shop can easily withstand the loss, no employee will be
disciplined or terminated due to the loss, I will not feel guilty afterward, and so forth. But for
purposes of illustration we suppose there are only two reasons.
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follows. Define predicates
C1(a) = Agent a would like to possess an item on
display in a shop.
C2(a) = Agent a can get away with stealing the item.
A(a) = Agent a will steal the item.
Because the agent’s reasons are an essential part of moral assessment, we evaluate
the agent’s action plan, which states that the agent will take a certain action
when certain reasons apply. In this case, the action plan is
(
C1(a) ∧ C2(a)
)⇒a A(a) (1)
Here ⇒a is not logical entailment but indicates that agent a regards C1(a) and
C2(a) as justifying A(a). The reasons in the action plan should be the most
general set of conditions that the agent takes as justifying the action. Thus
the action plan refers to an item in a shop rather than specifically to a watch,
because the fact that it is a watch is not relevant to the justification; what
matters is whether the agent wants the item and can get away with stealing it.
We can now state the generalization principle using quantified modal logic.
Let C(a)⇒a A(a) be an action plan for agent a, where C(a) is a conjunction of
the reasons for taking action A(a). The action plan is generalizable if and only
if
aP
(
∀x(C(x)⇒x A(x)) ∧ C(a) ∧A(a)) (2)
Here P (S) means that it is physically possible for proposition S to be true, and
aS means that a can rationally believe S. The proposition aS is equivalent
to ¬a¬S, where a¬S means that rationality requires require a to deny S.2
Thus (2) says that agent a can rationally believe that it is possible for everyone
to have the same action plan as a, even while a’s reasons still apply and a takes
the action.
2The operators  and  have a somewhat different interpretation here than in traditional
epistemic and doxastic modal logics, but the identity S ≡ ¬¬S holds as usual.
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Returning to the theft example, the condition (2) becomes
aP
(
∀x(C1(x) ∧ C2(x)⇒x A(x)) ∧ C1(a) ∧ C2(a) ∧A(a)) (3)
This says that it is rational for a to believe that it is physically possible for
the following to be true simultaneously: (a) everyone steals when the stated
conditions apply, and (b) the conditions apply and a steals. Since (3) is false,
action plan (1) is unethical.
The necessity of (3) for the rightness of action plan (1) is anchored in
deontological theory, while the falsehood of (3) is a fact about the world. This
fact might be inferred by collecting responses from shop owners about how
they would react if theft were widespread. Thus ethics and empirical VA work
together in a very specific way: ethics tells us that (3) must be true if the theft
is to be ethical, and empirical VA provides evidence that bears on whether (3)
is true.
An action plan in the autonomous vehicle domain might be
C(a, y)⇒a A(a, y) (4)
where y is a free variable, and
C(a, y) = Ambulance y under the direction of agent a can reach its
destination sooner by using siren and lights.
A(a, y) = Agent a will direct ambulance y to use siren and lights.
Agent a is the ambulance driver, or in the case of an autonomous vehicle, the
designer of the software that controls the ambulance. The generalization principle
requires that
aP(∀x∀y(C(x, y)⇒y A(x, y)) ∧ ∀y(C(a, y) ∧A(a, y))) (5)
This says that it is rational for agent a to believe that siren and lights could
continue to hasten arrival if all ambulances used them for all trips, emergencies
and otherwise. If empirical VA reveals that most drivers would ignore siren and
lights if they were universally abused in this fashion, then we have evidence that
(5) is false, in which case action plan (4) is unethical.
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4.2. Maximizing Utility
Utilitarianism is normally understood as a consequentialist theory that judges
an act by its actual consequences. Specifically, an act is ethical only if it
maximizes net expected utility for all who are affected. Yet the utilitarian
principle can also be construed, in deontological fashion, as requiring the agent
to select actions that the agent can rationally believe will maximize net expected
utility. This avoids judging an action choice as wrong simply because rational
beliefs about the consequences of the action happen to be incorrect. While
utilitarians frequently view utility maximization as the sole ethical principle,
deontology sees it as an additional necessary condition for an ethical action. The
other principles continue to apply, because only actions that satisfy these other
principles are considered as options for maximizing utility.
A deontic utilitarian principle can be derived from the universality of reason,
roughly as follows. If an agent believes that a certain state of affairs has ultimate
value, such as happiness, then the agent must regard this belief as equally valid
for any agent, and must pursue happiness in a way that would be rationally
chosen by any agent. A utilitarian argues that this can be accomplished by
selecting actions that the agent rationally believes will maximize the expected
net sum of happiness over everyone who is affected.3
The utilitarian principle can be formalized as follows. Let u(C(a), A(a)) be a
utility function that measures the total net expected utility of action A(a) under
conditions C(a). Then an action plan C(a) ⇒a A(a) satisfies the utilitarian
principle only if agent a can rationally believe that action A(a) creates at least as
much utility as any ethical action that is available under the same circumstances.
3Alternatively, one might argue that maximizing the minimum utility over those affected
(or achieving a lexicographic maximum) is the rational way to take everyone’s utility into
account, after the fashion of John Rawls’s difference principle [17]. Or one might argue for some
rational combination of utilitarian and equity objectives [18, 19]. However, for many practical
applications, simple utility maximization appears to be a sufficiently close approximation to
the rational choice, and to simplify exposition we assume so in this paper.
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This can be written
a∀A′(E(C(a), A′(a))→ u(C(a), A(a)) ≥ u(C(a), A′(a))) (6)
where A′ ranges over actions. The predicate E(C(a), A′(a)) means that action
A′(a) is available for agent a under conditions C(a), and that the action plan
C(a)⇒a A′(a) is generalizable and respects autonomy.4 Note that we are now
quantifying over predicates and have therefore moved into second-order logic.
Popular views about acceptable behavior frequently play a role in applications
of the utilitarian principle. For example, in some parts of the world, drivers
consider it wrong to enter a stream of moving traffic from a side street without
waiting for a gap in the traffic. In other parts of the world this can be acceptable,
because drivers in the main thoroughfare expect it and make allowances. Suppose
driver a’s action plan is (C1(a) ∧ C2(a))⇒a A(a), where
C1(a) = Driver a wishes to enter a main thoroughfare.
C2(a) = Driver a can enter a main thoroughfare by moving
into the traffic without waiting for a gap.
A(a) = Driver a will move into traffic without waiting
for a gap.
As before, driver a is the designer of the software if the vehicle is autonomous.
Using (6), the driver’s action plan maximizes utility only if
a∀A′(E(C1(a), C2(a), A′(a))→
u
(
C1(a), C2(a), A(a)
) ≥ u(C1(a), C2(a), A′(a))) (7)
Suppose we wish to design driving policy in a context where pulling immediately
into traffic is considered unacceptable. Then doing so is a dangerous move that
no one is expecting, and an accident could result. Waiting for a gap in the
traffic results in greater net expected utility, or formally, u(C1(a), C2(a), A(a)) <
u(C1(a), C2(a), A
′(a)), where A′(a) is the action of waiting for a gap. So (7)
4For “respecting autonomy,” see the next section.
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is false, and its falsehood can be inferred by collecting popular views about
acceptable driving behavior.
Again we have a clear demonstration of how ethical principles can combine
with empirical VA. The utilitarian principle tells us that a particular action plan
is ethical only if (7) is true, and empirical VA tells us whether (7) is true.
4.3. Respect for Autonomy
A third ethical principle requires agents to respect the autonomy of other
agents. Specifically, an agent should not adopt an action plan that the agent is
rationally constrained to believe is inconsistent with an ethical action plan of
another agent, without informed consent. Murder, enslavement, and inflicting
serious injury are extreme examples of autonomy violations, because they interfere
with many ethical action plans. Coercion may or may not violate autonomy,
depending on precisely how action plans are formulated.
The argument for respecting autonomy is basically as follows. Suppose I
violate someone’s autonomy for certain reasons. That person could, at least
conceivably, have the same reasons to violate my autonomy. This means that, due
to the universality of reason, I am endorsing the violation of my own autonomy
in such a case. This is a logical contradiction, because it implies that I am
deciding not to do what I decide to do. To avoid contradicting myself, I must
avoid interfering with other action plans.5
5A more adequate analysis leads to a principle of joint autonomy, according to which it is
violation of autonomy to adopt an action plan that is mutually inconsistent with action plans
of a set of other agents, when those other action plans are themselves mutually consistent.
Joint autonomy addresses situations in which an action necessarily interferes with the action
plan of some agent but no particular agent, as when someone throws a bomb into a crowd. A
general formulation of the joint autonomy principle in terms of modal operators is given in
[16]. An fully adequate account must also recognize that interfering with an action plan is
acceptable when there is informed consent to a risk of interference, because giving informed
consent is equivalent to including the possibility of interference as one of the antecedents of the
action plan. Furthermore, interfering with an unethical action plan is no violation of autonomy,
because an unethical action plan is, strictly speaking, not an action plan due to the absence of
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To formulate an autonomy principle, we say that agent a’s action plan
C1 ⇒a A1 is consistent with b’s action plan C2 ⇒b A2 when
aP (A1 ∧A2) ∨ ¬aP (C1 ∧ C2) (8)
This says that agent a can rationally believe that the two actions are mutually
consistent, or can rationally believe that the reasons for the actions are mutually
inconsistent. The latter suffices to avoid inconsistency of the action plans,
because if the reasons for them cannot both apply, the actions can never come
into conflict.
As an example of how coercion need not violate autonomy, suppose agent b
wishes to catch a bus and has decided to cross the street to a bus stop, provided
no traffic is coming. The agent’s action plan is(
C2 ∧ C3 ∧ ¬C4
)⇒b A2 (9)
where
C2 = Agent b wishes to catch a bus.
C3 = There is a bus stop across the street.
C4 = There are cars approaching.
A2 = Agent b will cross the street.
Agent a sees agent b begin to cross the street and forcibly pulls b out of the path
of an oncoming car that b does not notice. Agent a’s action plan is(
C1 ∧ C4
)⇒a A1 (10)
where
C1 = Agent b is about to cross the street.
A1 = Agent a will prevent agent b from crossing the street.
a coherent set of reasons for it. An action plan is considered unethical in this context when
it violates the generalization or utility principle, or interferes with an action plan that does
not violate one of these principles, and so on recursively. These and other complications are
discussed in [20]. They are not incorporated into the present discussion because they are
inessential to showing how ethical principles and empirical VA interact.
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Agent a does not violate agent b’s autonomy, even though there is coercion.
Their action plans (9) and (10) are consistent with each other, because the
condition (8) becomes
aP (A1 ∧A2) ∨ ¬aP (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ ¬C3 ∧ C4 ∧ C3) (11)
This says that either (a) agent a can rationally believe that the two actions
are consistent with each other, or (b) agent a can rationally believe that the
antecedents of (9) and (10) are mutually inconsistent. As it happens, the
two actions are obviously not consistent with each other, and so (a) is false.
However, agent a can rationally believe that the antecedents of (9) and (10) are
mutually inconsistent, because C3 and ¬C3 are contradictory. This means (b) is
true, which implies that condition (11) is satisfied, and there is no violation of
autonomy.
This again clearly distinguishes the roles of ethics and empirical observation
in VA. Ethical reasoning tells us that (11) must be true if autonomy is to be
respected, whereas observation of the world tells us whether (11) is true.
To illustrate how autonomy may play a role in the ethics of driving, suppose
that a pedestrian dashes in front of a rapidly moving car. The driver can slam
on the brake and avoid impact with the pedestrian, but another car is following
closely, and a sudden stop could cause a crash. This is not a trolley car dilemma,
because hitting the brake does not necessarily cause an accident, although failing
to do so is certain to kill or seriously injure the pedestrian. The driver a must
choose between two possible action plans:(
C1 ∧ C2
)⇒a A1 (12)(
C1 ∧ C2
)⇒a ¬A1 (13)
where
C1 = A pedestrian b is dashing in front of a’s car.
C2 = Another car is closely following a’s car.
A1 = Agent a will immediately slam on the brake.
Meanwhile, the pedestrian b has any number of action plans that are inconsistent
with death or serious injury. Let C3 ⇒b A2 be one of them. Also the occupant c
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of the other car (there is only one occupant) has action plans that are inconsistent
with an injury. We suppose that C4 ⇒c A3 is one of them.
We first check whether hitting the brake, as in action plan (12), is inconsistent
with the other driver’s action plan C3 ⇒c A3. The condition (8) becomes
aP (A1 ∧A3) ∨ ¬aP (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C4) (14)
The first disjunct is clearly true, because a can rationally believe that it is
possible that hitting the brake is consistent with avoiding a rear-end collision
and therefore with any planned action C4 ⇒c A3, even if this improbable. So
action plan (12) does not violate joint autonomy.
We now check whether a failure to hit the brake, as in action plan (13), is
inconsistent with the pedestrian’s action plan C3 ⇒b A2. There is no violation
of autonomy if
aP (¬A1 ∧A2) ∨ ¬aP(C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3) (15)
The first disjunct is clearly false for one or more of b’s action plans C3 ⇒b A2,
because the driver cannot rationally believe that a failure to hit the brake is
consistent with all of the pedestrian’s action plans. The second disjunct is
likewise false, because the driver has no reason to believe that C1, C2 and C3 are
mutually inconsistent. Thus (15) is false, and we have a violation of autonomy.
The driver should therefore slam on the brake. There is no need to check the
other ethical principles, because only one of the possible action plans satisfies
the autonomy principle.
This is a case in which observation of human preferences and beliefs play little
or no role in determining what is ethical, because the physics of the situation
decides the truth of (14) and (15). There is little point in sampling the behavior
of drivers in such situations or their opinions about the consequences of braking
or not braking.
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5. Conclusion
As AI rises inexorably into everyday life, it takes its seat beside humans. AI’s
increasing sophistication wields power, and with that power comes responsibility.
The goal, then, must be to invest machines with a moral sensitivity that resembles
the human conscience. But conscience is not static; it is a dynamic process
of moral reasoning that adjusts ethical principles systematically to empirical
observations. In this paper we have elaborated two challenges to AI moral
reasoning that spring from the interrelation of facts and values, challenges that
have heretofore been neglected. The first is a pervasive temptation to confuse
facts with values; the second is a confusion about the process of moral reasoning
itself. In addressing these challenges, we have identified specific instances of
how and why AI designers commit the naturalistic fallacy and why they tend
to oversimplify the process of moral reasoning. We have sketched, in turn, a
plan for understanding moral reasoning in machines, a plan in which modal logic
captures the interaction of deontological ethical principles with factual states of
affairs.
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